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Regulation scholars have long searched for the best tools to use to achieve public policy 
goals, generating an extensive body of research on what has become known as instrument 
choice. By contrast, analysis of options for structuring how officials make regulatory 
decisions – process choice – remains in relative infancy. Notwithstanding the emphasis 
legal scholars and political economists have placed on administrative procedures, 
surprisingly little research has investigated why regulators choose among different 
process options or what value they and the public receive from different choices. In their 
book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak 
make a significant contribution by empirically and normatively examining regulators’ 
choices between notice-and-comment rulemaking, negotiated rulemaking, and what they 
call “regulation by litigation.” This review considers three central questions about 
regulation by litigation. First, how if at all does regulation by litigation differ from other 
uses of litigation to achieve policy goals? Second, why do regulators choose litigation 
over other process options? Third, is regulation by litigation as bad as Morriss, Yandle, 
and Dorchak say it is? By addressing these conceptual, empirical, and normative 
questions, this review not only reveals the specific strengths and limitations of the book, 
Regulation by Litigation, but it also highlights more general opportunities and challenges 
for future research on process choice. 
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Process Choice 
 
Cary Coglianese 
 
 From its infancy, the study and practice of regulation has been dominated by a 
search for the best tool to fit the job of achieving specific policy objectives.  Under the 
general banner of research on instrument choice, economists, legal scholars, and policy 
analysts have extensively debated the relative merits of what they have called command-
and-control regulation when compared against various alternatives, such as market-based 
instruments, information disclosure, planning requirements, and taxes and subsidies, each 
viewed as a distinct means of achieving substantive goals and improving social welfare.  
The vast body of research on regulatory instrument choice contrasts with the relatively 
small amount of attention paid to the choices embedded in structuring the process of 
deciding what regulatory tool to use to address specific problems.  This separate question 
-- what might be labeled process choice – emerges from the recognition that regulatory 
tools can be selected through a variety of different processes involving decision makers 
across several distinct branches of government.  The decision makers who select 
regulatory tools can be legislators, regulatory agency officials, or even sometimes judges, 
and they can go about making their decisions by using different means of engaging with 
the organizations and individuals affected by their decisions. 
 Admittedly, administrative law scholars have long recognized and written about 
various procedures to use in making new regulations, and in recent decades political 
economy scholars have shown how administrative procedures can be used by legislators, 
 
 
2 
presidents, and judges to impose oversight and control on the unelected regulatory 
officials that run the agencies making up what is sometimes called a “fourth” branch of 
government.  Yet for different reasons, in neither research tradition – administrative law 
or political economy – have scholars asked the type of empirical and normative questions 
that, with different purposes, dominate the literature on instrument choice.    
Administrative law scholars have tended to assess procedures against various rule-of-law 
values, such as consent, accountability, and transparency, but generally have not analyzed 
empirically why regulatory officials choose to adopt one procedure versus another when 
they are confronted with more than one procedural option.  Political economy scholars 
have focused on procedures as mechanisms for solving government-level principal-agent 
problems, namely, those arising from the risk that delegating regulatory authority from 
the legislature to unelected bureaucrats will undermine democratic accountability.  They 
have focused much less on explaining the strategic choices those bureaucrats confront 
about how to structure their own decision making. 
 In their book, Regulation by Litigation, Andrew Morriss, Bruce Yandle, and 
Andrew Dorchak (“MYD”) provide a welcome and helpful focus on precisely such 
process choices that regulators find themselves confronting.  MYD introduce a process 
they call “regulation by litigation” and, after comparing this process with both traditional 
and negotiated rulemaking, they proceed to raise both empirical and normative questions 
about regulating through litigation.  Their main empirical question is explanatory. 
Recognizing that policy decision makers, particularly those who work in administrative 
agencies, face different process options, what explains why they sometimes choose 
litigation as a lever to achieve policy objectives?  MYD’s answer follows a reasonable 
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public choice framework whereby individual decision makers act on the basis of the cost 
and benefits that they face, both in terms of their own personal preferences but also from 
the kind of rewards and sanctions that they face in their political environment.  MYD’s 
normative question is, straightforwardly, whether having regulators choose the option of 
regulation by litigation is a good thing.  MYD’s negative answer to this second question 
is not unrelated to their views about the answer to the first question.  They see unelected 
regulators using regulation by litigation as a strategic option to lower their costs of 
regulating, namely by allowing them to escape public scrutiny, without yielding any 
comparable public benefits in return.  Indeed, MYD argue that “[f]rom the public’s 
perspective, there are no benefits to [regulation by litigation]…and there are substantial 
costs” (50-51). 
 Regulation by Litigation’s thesis is clear and provocative.  Although not all 
readers will agree entirely with its conclusions, Regulation by Litigation nevertheless 
makes an important contribution by laying down key questions for future empirical 
research on process choice as well as for future normative evaluations of alternative 
regulatory procedures.  The book also provides the first in-depth account of the process 
choices faced by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in regulating nitrogen 
oxide (NOx) pollution from diesel trucks.   
In this review essay, I consider three major questions raised by MYD’s work.  
First, what exactly is the process that MYD call “regulation by litigation”?  Second, why 
do regulators choose this process?  Third, would an increase in regulation by litigation be 
a serious problem?  In provoking each of these questions, Regulation by Litigation makes 
a signal achievement in illuminating avenues for the study of process choice. 
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What is Regulation by Litigation? 
 In order to investigate different process choices empirically and assess them 
normatively, it is essential first to understand exactly what each choice entails.  At its 
most general level, the choice of regulation by litigation is one that, according to MYD, 
involves the use of “litigation and the courts to achieve and apply regulatory outcomes to 
entire industries” (p. 1).  Regulation by litigation arises when lawyers use litigation to 
achieve “ends that could be and traditionally had been achieved by regulatory agencies 
using rulemaking procedures” (p. 1).   
Of course, lawyers have long used litigation to achieve policy objectives.  In the 
United States, the practice dates back at least to the early nineteenth century, when Alexis 
de Tocqueville observed that nearly all major political issues ultimately become ones for 
resolution in the courts.  Over the last century, lawyers have used litigation to break-up 
ATT’s phone service monopoly (Coll 1986, Chen 1997) and desegregate public schools 
(Rosenberg 1991, Vose 1958), to establish regulatory protection for air quality (Melnick 
1983) and give the disabled greater access to employment and public services (Katzman 
1986, Olson 1984, Burke 2002).  Nearly three decades ago, Donald Horowitz, in his 
classic book entitled The Courts and Social Policy, observed the “increasing 
subordination” of traditional adjudication to policy making, lamenting “the expansion of 
judicial responsibility more nearly to overlap the responsibilities of other governmental 
institutions” and the tendency of lawsuits to become “mere vehicles for an exposition of 
more general policy problems” (Horowitz 1977).   
 Is “regulation by litigation” just a new label for an old wine?  According to MYD, 
regulation by litigation is different.  It is actually a “new phenomenon,” a “new trend,” 
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even a “new form of regulation” (p. 1).  They suggest it is on “the rise,” if not even 
“taking hold” (p. 2).  What, then, distinguishes this supposedly new phenomenon from 
the longstanding use of litigation to affect public policy?  Regulation by litigation, MYD 
tell us, requires more than just litigation, even litigation with larger policy ambitions.  
More is needed than just an enforcement or liability suit alleging “a violation of an 
existing statute, regulation, or common-law rule” (p.47).  Litigation must be used as the 
vehicle to apply new, binding rules on an entire industry, much like a regulatory agency 
would do through the rulemaking process. 
 MYD specify three criteria for distinguishing regulation by litigation from other 
uses of litigation: 
1. Forward-looking relief.  The litigation needs to be used to seek prospective 
relief.  MYD state that the plaintiff must persuade or coerce “the regulated 
entity to agree to the imposition of regulatory provisions that serve as 
substantive constraints on the defendants’ behavior in the future, not simply 
the payment of fines for past behavior” (p. 48).  Presumably any litigation 
seeking injunctive relief or obtaining behavioral concessions as part of a 
settlement would meet this criterion, so by itself the forward-looking criterion 
is not enough to distinguish regulation by litigation from other policy-oriented 
litigation. 
2. Large portion of an industry. Regulation by litigation also requires the use of 
litigation to shape the behavior of private sector institutions – particularly, 
business firms.  But it must do more than target a single firm.  Instead, it 
“must impose requirements on enough of the regulated industry to be an 
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effective substitute for a generally applicable rule” (p. 48).  Of course, thanks 
to the common law’s system of stare decisis, a precedent established in 
litigation against a single firm may well typically induce behavioral changes 
by a large portion of the same industry.  When McDonald’s is successfully 
sued over its hot coffee, other restaurants may learn of the jury verdict and 
reduce the temperature of their coffee too.  But MYD apparently would view 
such changes by other restaurants as “voluntary,” preferring instead to treat as 
regulation by litigation only those cases that “mandate prospective changes to 
an entire industry,” presumably by having most members of the industry as 
named defendants in the litigation (p. 2, emphasis added). 
3. Out-of-Court Settlement.  Although apparently not a strict definitional 
necessity, the settlement of claims out of court seems part and parcel of 
MYD’s conception of regulation by litigation.  Regulation by litigation “is 
more likely when the result is a series of settlements than when a court 
conclusively interprets a statute or rule” (p. 49).  The reason is that regulation 
by litigation, especially when used by an administrative agency, occurs when 
the “agency … exceed[s] the unambiguous authority it has under its organic 
statute” (p.   49).  Regulation by litigation also restricts public participation, as 
settlement negotiations take place in the secret confines of litigation between a 
limited number of parties – not in a setting open to all affected parties.  As 
such, MYD worry that “regulators’ factual assumptions and policy decisions 
receive much less scrutiny in a settlement than they do in rulemaking and 
negotiation” (p. 49).   
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Although forward-looking relief obtained through settlement that is binding on a 
large portion of an industry appears to constitute the definitional core of regulation by 
litigation, MYD further indicate that, to their minds, “the most important features of 
regulation-by-litigation are:” 
• “lack of public participation,” 
• “elimination of political competition and…oversight,” 
• “reduced opportunities for challenges to the agency’s views,” 
• “piecemeal nature of the regulatory outcome, with settlements binding only on 
individual parties and not the public generally,” and 
• “litigation with sufficient coverage of the regulatory industry to serve as a 
substitute for generally applicable rules” (p. 49). 
Obviously there is some overlap between these features and the three main criteria.  And 
of course, again, at least some of these features apply equally to the old uses of litigation 
to achieve policy objectives.  For example, the public really does not participate in any 
litigation, and binding decisions by judges eliminate political competition and oversight 
whether in the supposedly new regulation by litigation or the older, more traditional 
policymaking litigation.  
 If MYD’s definition does not fully clarify how regulation by litigation differs 
from ordinary policy making litigation, perhaps concrete examples can make the 
difference clearer.  Fortunately, a substantial part of Regulation by Litigation consists of 
three case studies that serve to illustrate what the authors mean by regulation by 
litigation.  The three cases are:  (1) private tort litigation filed against manufacturers of 
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asbestos and silica products; (2) lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against major 
cigarette companies; and (3) litigation brought by the EPA against manufacturers of 
heavy-duty diesel engines. In each of these cases, litigation resulted in forward-looking 
change across the respective industries, but unfortunately they do not appear, in the main, 
to be much different than other cases of policy litigation in the courts.  Moreover, it is not 
even clear whether the asbestos case neatly fits MYD’s own definitional criteria.  The 
tobacco and diesel engine litigation resulted in major out-of-court settlements that, by 
their very terms, resulted in prospective standards of industry conduct, whereas the 
asbestos litigation involved adjudicated outcomes in some cases and settlements in 
others, without a single injunction or settlement that operated as a form of regulation.  
Despite the scope and impact of the asbestos litigation on the industry, the curtailment of 
asbestos production in the U.S. appears to have stemmed less from a forward-looking 
mandate contained as part of any litigation relief as from bankruptcies that the litigation 
drove.  The asbestos litigation, MYD write, “became truly regulatory only when the 
volume of claims began to force otherwise healthy companies into bankruptcy” (p. 123; 
see also p. 109).  It is also possible that, rather than serving as direct regulatory devices, 
these resulting bankruptcies may actually have provided more of a means for the asbestos 
industry to escape from under a cascade of tort claims, allowing them to continue to 
produce and sell asbestos products, if not in the United States then at least elsewhere in 
the world.   
 MYD might have made a clearer case for distinguishing the purportedly “new” 
regulation by litigation from the “old” policy litigation had they restricted regulation by 
litigation to lawsuits brought by regulatory agencies.  Indeed, at a number of parts of the 
 
 
9 
book, MYD write as if that is actually what they have in mind, referring to an agency as 
the prototypical plaintiff involved in regulation by litigation.  In framing the process 
choice that lies at the core of their book, for example, they write that regulation by 
litigation occurs when, “[r]ather than issue a proposed rule or invite affected parties to 
negotiate a rule, an agency (or a private actor) sues one or more regulated entities, 
charging them with violation of an existing statute, regulation, or common-law rule” (p. 
47).  The parenthetical – “or a private actor” – reads as if it had been inserted as an 
afterthought, for no private actor could bring litigation “rather than issue a proposed 
rule…or negotiate a rule.”  The alternative of regulating by something other than 
litigation only exists for agencies like the EPA.  Indeed, in most states, even attorneys 
general would not have the authority to issue proposed, substantive rules regulating an 
industry.   
  The case study of the EPA’s diesel engine emissions regulation -- and litigation -- 
seems to fit best with MYD’s definition of the core process choice they analyze.  This 
case study is also probably the best candidate of the three in the book to support the claim 
that regulation by litigation is a “new phenomenon.”  Simply because the modern U.S. 
regulatory state is much newer than the nation’s common law origins, the strategic use of 
litigation by regulatory agencies as an alternative to rulemaking is bound to be a newer 
phenomenon than the longstanding use of litigation to achieve public policy objectives.  
Furthermore, others have already extensively written detailed accounts of the asbestos 
litigation and the tobacco litigation (e.g., Viscusi 2002).  What is new in MYD’s book is 
its exceptionally detailed account of the EPA’s heavy duty diesel regulation and, 
specifically, of the EPA’s deployment of a risky enforcement strategy to leverage change 
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in the industry without relying squarely on rulemaking.  To be sure, others have written 
about agency use of litigation to achieve regulatory goals, as well as the imposition of 
additional requirements through the settlement of enforcement actions (Kagan 2001, 
Rossi 2001, Schmidt 2005), but MYD’s case study of the EPA’s diesel engine litigation 
is still well worth the price of MYD’s book.  That case study, if no other, reveals a 
regulation-by-litigation phenomenon that does indeed merit further analysis:  namely, the 
practice of a regulatory agency choosing to take aggressive, and perhaps even long-shot, 
enforcement litigation against an industry or large segment thereof, seeking to settle with 
agreement on binding, forward-looking action, akin to what the agency would obtain by 
promulgating a new regulation. 
 
Why Regulate by Litigation? 
 
 When regulation by litigation is understood as an alternative strategy for 
achieving regulatory goals – a process choice – the empirical question arises: Why do 
regulators choose this strategy?  MYD set out to answer this question, seeking “to 
achieve an explanation of why, when, and how the episodes occurred” and “laying a 
theoretical foundation that will help explain [regulation by litigation] as an alternative 
regulatory phenomenon” (p. 3).  They recognize they cannot fully test their explanation, 
given that they present (at most) only three case studies. But what helpfully emerges from 
the book is an interesting set of hypotheses or propositions that should, if nothing more, 
generate further productive empirical testing and theoretical development. 
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Those interesting empirical propositions, though, unfortunately only come at the 
very end of Regulation by Litigation. On the last two pages, MYD outline a strong set of 
plausible hypotheses about the conditions under which regulators might be expected to 
choose to regulate by litigation as opposed to engage in conventional rulemaking or even 
perhaps negotiated rulemaking.  They claim that “regulation-by-litigation is 
possible…only under limited conditions” (p. 176).   Specifically, three conditions must 
be met before regulators will choose to regulate by litigation.  First, the targeted industry 
must have only a small number of firms, so that the defendants in litigation will be a 
concentrated group.  Second, the regulator needs to be able to wield a large legal hammer 
in order to extract a settlement.  Finally, the settlement has to protect the defendants from 
new entrants who would ordinarily not be subject to the constraints imposed in the 
settlement.   
These three conditions strike me as suggesting plausible factors that could help 
explain regulators’ decisions to use of regulation by litigation.  Yet on the basis of just a 
small number of case studies, it is always hard to reach general conclusions, especially 
those claiming that specific conditions are necessary ones.  As MYD acknowledge, 
neither they nor the general research community are “at a point where we can randomly 
draw a sample of such cases and test our theories” (p. 3).  As this stage, richly detailed 
case studies, such as MYD’s chapter on EPA’s diesel emissions regulation, can serve a 
helpful role in the larger enterprise of advancing knowledge and anyone interested in 
domestic environmental rulemaking in the U.S. should certainly read at least that 
particular chapter of Regulation by Litigation.  In terms of actually explaining what 
triggers regulation by litigation, though, Regulation by Litigation’s lasting contribution 
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may simply be to have others later test, refine, and respond to their three-factor theory.  If 
MYD’s book motivates additional research on regulatory process choice, I would view 
this in itself as a meaningful contribution.   
 But we do not need to await future research to say one thing about the strong 
empirical claims MYD put forward.  The three conditions they postulate cannot be 
necessary conditions, as MYD claim.   If each of the three cases they present should be 
properly characterized as regulation by litigation, one of these cases – the asbestos 
litigation – actually disproves MYD’s claim that “the defendants must be a concentrated 
group” (p. 176, emphasis added).  Although MYD at one point claim the asbestos 
suppliers constituted a “small group” (p. 177), they also report earlier in their book that 
the asbestos litigation involved 8,400 defendants (p. 164)!  Perhaps this inconsistency is 
just another reason to treat the asbestos tort litigation as something other than “regulation 
by litigation.” Or perhaps MYD should simply temper their empirical claims.  Their three 
conditions may make regulation by litigation more likely to occur, but it strikes me as 
implausible – and certainly unsupportable at present – that these conditions “must” be 
met for regulation by litigation even to be “possible” (pp. 176-177). 
MYD do pay appropriate homage to the limitations of their empirical work, 
noting that they “lack sufficient data points for any sort of formal statistical analysis” (p. 
92).  But at other parts of the book they seem insufficiently attentive to even more 
fundamental limitations.  For example, in one telling passage, MYD acknowledge that 
their interview respondents at EPA “elicited numerous hypotheses about the rationales 
for the EPA’s behavior” in using litigation to regulate diesel engine emissions (p. 77), 
such as:   
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• “career advancement strategies for particular individuals at EPA,” 
• “political pressure related to Vice President Al Gore’s campaign for 
president,” 
• “rivalries between the air and enforcement offices,” 
• “a lack of internal communication,” and 
• “outrage by litigators and top policymakers at having failed to secure 
compliance by the engine manufacturers with the ‘spirit’ of their 
regulations”  (p. 77). 
 
MYD recognize that each of these factors may have contributed to EPA’s decision to 
litigate, but they quickly sweep them aside by asserting that “we think that the most 
convincing explanation is … one that takes into account the institutional framework and 
the incentives facing the agency” (p. 78).  They argue that EPA found itself under 
pressure to reduce NOx emissions quickly but could neither afford to take the time 
demanded by rulemaking, which would have also necessitated giving manufacturers 
sufficient lead time, nor invest the staff time in negotiated rulemaking, which probably 
would have failed to yield consensus anyway.  Quite possibly they are right.  They do 
elaborate the plausibility of their preferred explanation – but they never really show why 
their explanation is better than the others.   Of course, MYD really cannot show that their 
explanation is better than the five alternative suggested by their interview respondents.  
There is no way to use a single case – or even three case studies – to show why one of six 
explanatory accounts is the best.  This is a classic case of inferential over-determination.  
At a minimum, however, MYD could have done much more to provide reasons not 
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merely for why they found their explanation plausible but also for what exactly they 
found lacking in the alternative hypotheses suggested by their respondents.    
 It is hard to disagree with the key public choice premise underlying MYD’s 
explanatory account – namely that regulators “will act, or not, depending on the costs and 
benefits of their actions for themselves” (p. 34).  However, the well-known potential for 
such a theoretical approach to become tautological provides still further reason to read 
Regulation by Litigation’s explanatory claims much more tentatively than MYD 
sometimes make them seem.  What counts as a cost and as a benefit needs to be carefully 
defined and separated from the behavior to be explained.  Yet despite Regulation by 
Litigation’s engagingly thick description, the book actually provides relatively little 
independent evidence of regulators’ costs and benefits beyond the very behavior these 
costs and benefits are supposed to explain.  Unfortunately, one cannot conclude that 
regulation by litigation, or any process, arises due to regulators’ interests by using the 
regulators’ own process choice as the principal evidence of those interests.   
 
Is Regulation by Litigation a Good Thing? 
 
MYD’s answer to the normative question about regulation by litigation comes 
through clearly from the earliest pages of their book.  They argue that, from the 
standpoint of overall social welfare, “there are no benefits to regulation by 
litigation…and there are substantial costs” (pp. 50-51).  According to MYD, regulation 
by litigation’s shortcomings generally stem from its lack of openness.  They claim that 
regulation by litigation’s insularity limits rather than expands the information base 
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available for regulatory decision making. They also argue that regulation by litigation 
cannot readily offer a comprehensive solution for many regulatory problems because it 
only targets those firms and organizations that are named as defendants in litigation.  
These seem like plausible and important worries about regulation by litigation. 
Yet the very kind of tunnel vision and lack of information MYD attribute to regulation by 
litigation can certainly afflict ordinary rulemaking too (Breyer 1995), a point they do 
recognize (p. 12).  As MYD also acknowledge, the proper normative test of regulation by 
litigation involves assessing its “relative effectiveness” against other probable 
alternatives (p. 22) – not just determining whether it meets, in some absolute sense, an 
ideal test.   
Precisely for this reason, MYD would have done well to show that regulation by 
litigation performed relatively poorly by explicitly comparing its outcomes with those of 
other processes in comparable regulatory contexts.  Consider, in this regard, the EPA’s 
diesel engine emissions case.  MYD tell us that EPA faced a choice: lower NOx 
emissions by targeting mobile sources (like diesels) or go after stationary sources (like 
power plants) through the Clean Air Act’s normal regulatory process.  But MYD then 
proceed mainly to tell us just how costly and unproductive it was for EPA to target the 
diesel engines.  Notwithstanding the high compliance costs resulting from EPA’s 
regulation by litigation, the benefits of EPA’s approach turned out to be lower than 
expected because of what MYD call the pre-buy phenomenon – namely, customers 
stocking up on old engines in the face of future regulatory strictures.  As a result, MYD 
suggest, air quality may have actually worsened following EPA’s actions.  Their 
argument that the diesel engine strategy proved ineffectual, if not counterproductive, 
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seems convincing; however, it also seems possible that targeting stationary sources would 
have been even more costly and less beneficial.  Even if diesel engine regulation resulted 
in negative net benefits, we need to know whether these negative net benefits would have 
been smaller in absolute value than the negative net benefits that would have resulted 
from stationary sources.  Of course, in both instances the net benefits would be negative, 
meaning it would have been better for EPA to have done nothing rather than to regulate 
either mobile or stationary sources.  However, if EPA had been legally required to take 
some action due statutory language in the Clean Air Act, then choosing the least bad 
option is clearly the better choice – and perhaps that is exactly what the EPA did in the 
diesel engines case.  The more general lesson is that in those instances where an agency 
is required to regulate even when the net benefits of doing so will be negative, regulation 
by litigation could well be a good thing if it allows the agency to get around an absurd 
statutory command and find a solution that yields at least less bad outcomes than 
otherwise would result.   
 MYD also question the fundamental fairness of regulation by litigation. They 
argue that “[t]he more serious cost of the diesel regulation by litigation relates to the 
integrity of the regulatory process itself” (p. 91).  They claim that among regulation by 
litigation’s many problems, the most important “is the relative lack of due process 
afforded when litigation supplants traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, which 
allows for participation by all interested parties” (p. 2).  I am certainly sympathetic to 
questions about the fundamental fairness and democratic robustness of any regulatory 
procedure; however, MYD’s normative “due process” argument suffers from several 
weaknesses. 
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 First, any normative argument against regulation by litigation that relies on its 
lack of public participation is circular. MYD say that “[a]n important cost is that 
regulations imposed through litigation do not provide for public participation” (p. 51).  
Although I think they actually mean to say that such regulations do not emerge from a 
process that has provided or allowed for public participation, the main problem with 
MYD’s normative argument is that a lack of public participation is one of their central if 
not defining features of regulation by litigation.  Given MYD’s definition, saying that the 
lack of participation is a cost of regulation by litigation is simply saying that rules created 
through a process without public participation (that is, regulation by litigation) are 
created without public participation.  In other words, the problem with regulation by 
litigation is that it is, well, regulation by litigation. 
Second, although MYD explain that a lack of public participation can limit the 
amount of useful information that comes before the decision maker, they fail to consider 
whether regulation by litigation may provide offsetting informational advantages.  At 
least in theory, regulation by litigation might generate information due to courts’ 
subpoena authority.  In rulemaking, the kind of information submitted voluntarily by 
industry participants in their comments is presumably self-serving information – not 
necessarily false, but almost certainly selective in a manner that best advances firms’ 
interests (Coglianese 2007).  Compared with the potentially biased information that 
comes in over the transom, the ability of an agency, with a court’s blessing, to compel a 
business to turn over requested information may well prove more successful in terms of 
information generation. Not all agencies have their own subpoena authority, so regulation 
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by litigation could be a very good strategy in some cases where an agency suspects 
industry has information that the agency has been unable to obtain through other means. 
 Finally, MYD’s claim that the lack of public participation in litigation makes the 
process less legitimate needs to be supported with a clearer account of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy can be understood in both an ideal sense – that is, what truly makes a process 
legitimate from the standpoint of an omniscient observer – as well as in a public opinion 
sense – that is, whether members of the public themselves actually think regulations 
developed through litigation are less legitimate.  It is not clear whether MYD are making 
an ideal moral assessment of regulation-by-litigation’s legitimacy, or whether they are 
worried about what the public will think about it and how much support the public will 
give to outcomes achieved through this process.  If their concern is the latter type, it bears 
noting that courts and the legal system do cast their own patina of legitimacy in the 
public’s mind – simply as an empirical matter.  If their concern is of the former kind, 
MYD fail to offer a convincing argument with sufficient normative bite.  This is not to 
say that such an argument does not exist or could not be made; rather, it is only to say 
that MYD fail to deliver such a philosophical argument.  At times, MYD seem to suggest 
that regulation by litigation is illegitimate simply because it does not follow the steps the 
law normally requires for agency rulemaking, such as notice and public comment.  But if 
legitimacy is defined as what the law permits, it seems evident that the law provides for 
exactly the types of tort and enforcement actions that MYD write about in Regulation by 
Litigation -- as well as the settlement of these cases with agreements by defendants to 
undertake any variety of actions, even ones that they would not otherwise be obligated to 
undertake.   
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Nothing MYD describe is per se illegal, even if MYD or others might think it 
should be.  It may not be unreasonable to quarrel, as MYD do, with the legal theories 
plaintiffs advance in some cases; however, this is often true with litigation.  
Disagreement with a legal argument seems hardly sufficient to make the general 
approach of regulation by litigation illegitimate.  Of course, if regulation by litigation 
were conceived as encompassing only those cases where plaintiffs bring questionable 
legal cases, then perhaps one can make a general claim that this process is illegitimate – 
but in that case, the basis would again be circular or tautological.   
 Furthermore, some readers may wonder about how far MYD’s normative critique 
of regulation by litigation extends.  Does it extend to any instance in which the 
government alters the incentives of private sector actors to get them to do something that 
is costly and that those actors would not do on their own?  In recent decades, regulatory 
agencies like the EPA have created voluntary programs in an effort to provide positive 
rewards and encourage industry to go beyond compliance, achieving gains in 
environmental performance beyond what regulations would otherwise require.  For many 
observers, such a voluntary approach to the attainment of regulatory goals is laudable. If 
businesses can regulate themselves, they presumably will be more likely to do so in a 
sensible, less costly, and perhaps even more effective way than the government might 
command through ordinary regulation.  And yet, the legitimacy critique MYD offer of 
regulation by litigation would seem to apply presumptively with equal force against these 
voluntary programs as well, because the agency is trying to get firms to take action in a 
way that goes outside the normal notice and comment process.   
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The connection between MYD’s concerns in Regulation by Litigation and 
voluntary approaches to environmental problems is not as remote as one might think, 
especially considering that sometimes businesses’ voluntary efforts are prompted 
precisely by the threat of litigation.  It has been suggested, for instance, that the U.S. 
chemical industry’s creation of the oft-touted Responsible Care program came about after 
the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal, India, precisely because industry worried about the 
threat of new regulation and financial liability should such an accident ever occur in the 
United States (Lyon & Maxwell 2004).  Although MYD distinguish between such 
voluntary actions and true regulation by litigation, it is harder to see how their normative 
argument can be so cabined, nor why it should be.  A more developed normative analysis 
than MYD provide would be needed to determine whether (or how) industry self-
regulation should be lauded while regulation by litigation is disparaged.  
 
Conclusion 
 
  Although I have raised a number of questions prompted by Regulation by 
Litigation, these questions themselves speak to the richness of the book and the 
significance of its inquiry and argument.  Regulation by Litigation serves as an excellent 
example of an empirical and normative investigation of what I have called process 
choice, an important research area in need of additional work.  MYD do well to remind 
us that regulatory agencies have “a limited number of people, a limited budget, and 
limited time to get the job done, and there is almost an endless call for action,” so they 
confront crucial choices about their work: “How to set priorities? Which problems are 
 
 
21 
most critical? What are the benefits and costs?”  (p. 13).  What Regulation by Litigation 
does so well is show how these priorities and choices are not only the highly studied 
substantive ones about the actual design and stringency of regulatory instruments; they 
are also priorities and choices about how to make decisions and structure the regulatory 
policy-making process.  If Regulation by Litigation ultimately serves to motivate another 
generation of students and scholars to extend the inquiry MYD have begun, the book will 
most certainly have proved itself an enormous success.   
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